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Abstract 
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young generation. This mechanism can be interpreted as a private compensation device for 
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1. Introduction 
 
Private intergenerational support has received increasing attention in in the analysis of the 
effects of an aging population on the social security systems. Private transfers interact with 
social security programs. If private and public transfers are close substitutes, an expansion of 
public transfers could lead to a reduction in private transfers, diluting the effectiveness of any 
program. Wider social security coverage might for example cause children to reduce private 
transfers to their retired parents (“crowding out”). The goal of this paper is to investigate the 
relationship between public and private transfers by analysing German data. While 
intergenerational support can take many different forms like informal loans, transfers in kind 
or assistance with housework or child-care, this analysis concentrates on financial private 
transfers.  
First we examine the relationship between private transfers given by the elderly and the public 
transfers they receive. We want to find out if the relatively generous public pay-as-you-go 
pensions which are financed by the younger generation are paid back to them as private 
transfers by the elderly. This would be in line with Barro (1974) who argued that the 
generations of a family dynasty are altruistically linked. Parents consider the welfare of their 
children when maximizing their own utility. Therefore they might react to an inter-
generational reallocation of resources through state interventions by adapting their private 
intergenerational transfers. For instance, parents could compensate an increase of public pay-
as-you-go financed pensions by increasing their private financial transfers to their offspring. 
Indeed, German data show that public transfers positively affect the willingness to pay private 
transfers.1 While economists consider this to be an inefficient detour system, sociologists 
argue that generous public transfers allow the elderly to give financial resources to the ir 
children and strengthen therefore solidarity within the family (Kohli 1993). Because reci-
procity is an important determinant of transfer behaviour, the elderly can expect to receive 
support from their children in return. This is discussed in the literature as “crowding in” 
process (Künemund and Rein 1999). 
Secondly, this paper supplements the discussion about “crowding in” and “crowding out” by 
providing new empirical evidence about the substitution of private financial transfers to the 
elderly through public transfers. Even though financial transfers mainly flow from old to 
young, we observe financial support towards the elderly too. It is often argued that a well 
developed welfare state like in Germany reduces, i.e. “crowds out” this private help. 
                                                 
1 See Reil-Held (2002). The robustness of these results based on 1993 data will be checked in this paper by 
replicating the analysis with newer data from 1998. 
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However, sociologists point out that there is a “crowding in” process which represents a 
complementary relationship between public and private transfers by taking a broader view 
than looking at financial help only (Attias-Donfut and Wolff 2000). Public transfers allow the 
elderly to give financial resources to their children who support their parents in return by 
providing help or attention.  
In this paper we take a narrower perspective on financial transfers only and find new empi-
rical support for the crowding out hypothesis. We find that elderly receiving more public 
transfers are less likely to receive private financial support. Of course, this does not neces-
sarily contradict the crowding in hypothesis but points to the coexistence of both. However, 
for the design of social security systems the crowding out of private financial transfers 
through public support has to be kept in mind. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide the economic background 
and summarize former empirical evidence about the relationship between public and private 
transfers. Section 3 begins with an empirical description of the private transfer flow in 
Germany. After that the impact of public transfers on the transfer giving of the elderly is 
analysed. In section 4 a test of the crowding out hypothesis is introduced by investigating 
private transfers received by the elderly. Finally, we end with some concluding remarks. 
2. Public and private transfers: Background and former evidence 
2.1 Why should public transfers influence private transfer giving? 
One explanation, why public transfers received by the elderly could have a positive impact on 
the giving of private transfers to the young was delivered by Barro (1974, 1978). He pointed 
out that financial transfers from parents and children aim at neutralizing the efforts of the state 
to change the intergenerational allocation of resources, like an increase of government debt 
for instance. The underlying thought is that the generations of a family (“dynasty”) are 
altruistically linked. Therefore, the time horizon underlying their decisions goes beyond their 
own expected length of life and includes the utility of their offspring as well. In this case, 
parents might react for example to an increase of their pay-as-you-go financed pensions by 
increasing their financial support to the children in order to compensate them for the resulting 
contribution burden. This compensation payment can be realized either as a transfer inter 
vivos or as a bequest. This potential connection between public and private transfers will be 
empirically examined in section 3. 
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2.2 Public and private transfers: Crowding out or crowding in? 
Potential substitution effects between public and private transfers are relevant for social 
policy. Designers of social security programs have to ask if “private interfamily transfers take 
up the slack if social security programs are reduced” (Cox and Jakubson 1995). The crowding 
out hypothesis with respect to exchanges between generations assumes that a more generous 
welfare system weakens family solidarity: the supply of public pensions and services for 
elderly people crowd out familial help because children do not need to assist their parents 
when the state provides adequate income and services (Künemund and Rein 1999).  
But from their survey of the literature, Künemund and Rein (1999) conclude that the 
crowding out argument is often used but empirical tests about the negative impact of generous 
welfare state spending on family solidarity are hardly ever documented. From a sociological 
perspective crowding out of familial support is not self-evident. As reciprocity is an important 
motive of giving, 2 a generous welfare state enables the elderly to make gifts to their children 
which in turn creates incentives for the children to support the elderly.3 The strengthening of 
the family relationship permitted by sufficient public resources is described as “crowding in” 
(Künemund and Rein 1999). Daatland (2004) adds a further argument for a complementary 
relationship between public and private help. He argues that the welfare state might stimulate 
family efforts by sharing the burden. 
The assumption of a substitutive relationship between public and private transfers is 
supported by an analysis of Attias-Donfut and Wolff (2000) based on French data. For 
example they estimated the effect of public transfers on private transfers with respect to the 
financial support to children and find a strong positive correlation between the receipt of 
public transfers  and the probability of receiving financial help from parents.  
On the other hand, they also simulated how a 10 percent reduction of retirement pensions 
would affect private support. As a result, retired people decrease the amount of financial 
support to their children who have in turn to increase the financial support to their parents to 
let them maintain an adequate standard of living. The 10 percent decrease of public pensions 
leads to an increase of 6.9 per cent in the probability of financial gifts from the middle 
                                                 
2 Künemund and Rein (1999) investigate the impact of giving and receiving based on the so-called Five Nation 
Study which is a survey conducted for the Commonwealth Fund in 1991. It includes Canada, Japan, United 
Kingdom, Germany and the USA. They provide evidence for the effect of reciprocity: those who give are more 
likely to receive. 
3 They assert another argument: Welfare state spending does reduce the “burden” of family relationships. “When 
elderly people have sufficient resources of their own, they are not forced by necessity to rely on their families. 
Therefore interactions focused on intimacy and closeness have the potential to develop.” (Künemund and Rein 
1999) 
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generation to their parents and a reduction of 2.1 per cent in the probability of financial help 
from the older to the middle generation (Attias-Donfut and Wolff 2000).  
Künemund and Rein (1999) used an international comparison in order to test the existence of 
crowding in versus crowding out. Based on the so-called Five-Nations-Study they find that 
Germany is the country where elderly people are most likely to receive help from their 
children outside the household. Nearly 90 per cent report that they receive at least one of four 
types of help.4 By contrast, the UK is the country where help is received the least often. Since 
the welfare systems in the countries included differ substantially, Germans are expected to get 
less financial help than the elderly in the US for instance.5 Less need or help with money 
might result in a crowding in of services. The data show that the German case is a clear 
example of a generous social security system that does not lead to a crowding out of family 
solidarity in general: elderly do not even receive significantly less help with money as the 
crowding out hypothesis would suggest. Furthermore, Germany has the lowest percentage of 
elderly who do not receive any help at all. Künemund and Rein (1999) conclude that these 
findings do not support the crowding out hypothesis. 
Daatland (2004) uses the OASIS data for an international comparison of help profiles.6 He 
can neither find support for crowding-out nor what he calls the ‘strong variant’ of crowding in 
where public services are expected to increase family help. Instead the findings fit with a 
weaker variant of crowding in, “namely that a generous welfare state allows the family to re-
orient their responsibility towards tasks and needs that are not well covered (and possibly 
create a lower burden for the children).” This would not only lead to an increase of total care 
levels but to more independent intergenerational relationships as well. 
Economists stress the importance of the underlying bequest motive for the process of crow-
ding out. In general we distinguish between altruism and trading of benefits as the two main 
transfer motives (e.g. Cox 1987). Altruism is based on familial care and the moral duty to 
help. In altruistic models parents consider the utility of their children when maximizing their 
own utility (Becker 1974, Barro 1974). The exchange motive assumes that one gives to others 
because he expects to get something back in return. 7  
                                                 
4 The four types of help in this study are help when ill, take care of house, help with transport and help out with 
money. 
5 The differences between the welfare can be measured by a higher pension replacement rate and a lower poverty 
rate in Germany. 
6 The OASIS project includes Norway, England, Germany, Spain and Israel. 
7 There are different forms of exchange models in the literature: e.g. Cox (1987) considers an exchange of 
services and inner familial credit markets, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) elaborate the family as an annuity market 
 6
The two transfer motives have different implications for the crowding out process. Purely 
altruistically motivated private transfers are crowded out by public transfers as it does not 
matter from whom the person in need receives help. But the effect is a priori unclear in 
exchange models. It depends on the difference between the parent’s and the child’s marginal 
utility of consumption when no transfers occur (Cox and Jakubson 1995). On a large scale 
altruistically motivated transfers would therefore dampen or even neutralize the distributional 
impact of public transfers while exchange motivated transfers can reinforce the effects of 
public transfers. In Cox and Jakubson’s empirical analysis about the distributional impact of 
anti-poverty programs in the US they take the response on private transfers into account. 
Their findings suggest an exchange rather than altruistic motive for private transfers. This 
indicates that the effect of public transfers can be magnified by private transfer behaviour.  
In total, the international empirical evidence about the prevalence of altruism is very mixed.8 
For Germany, an empirical analysis of Jürges (1999) does not lead to a clear result which he 
interprets as an indication for the presence of both exchange and altruistically motivated 
transfers. On the other hand survey results about the motives of familial support do indicate 
an altruistic notion. Kohli et. al. (2000a) infer a social consensus about indigent relatives what 
they interpret as altruism. About 90 percent of the respondents in the Ageing Survey claim 
that they always would help their relatives if they need their support. With respect to 
inheritances Wilk (1995) found in group discussions too, that altruism seems to dominate the 
notion of exchange in Germany. 
 
3 The impact of public transfers on private transfers in Germany 
3.1 The flow of transfers inter vivos in Germany 
As a basis for investigating the relationship between public and private transfers in Germany 
the flow of private intergenerational transfers is shortly presented in this section. In the 
nineties about one third of the elderly payed a transfer to the younger generation of about 
5000 and 7000 DM9.  The quantitative significance of private transfers can be illustrated by 
aggregating the transfer volume from old to young. An aggregation based on the transfer data 
in the so-called “Ageing Survey” yields a transfer volume of 9 percent of total pension 
                                                                                                                                                        
while Bernheim et. al. (1985) use a game theoretical approach to explain transfer behaviour as “strategic 
bequests”. 
8 See e.g. Masson and Pestieau 1997, Reil-Held 2002 for an overview. 
9 The results vary because of different survey techniques and samples in the different data sets. See Reil-Held 
(2002) for an overview about private transfer data. 
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payments which represents an average transfer payment by each pensioner of about one sixth 
of his pension income (Kohli 1998).10 
Private transfers in the opposite direction, namely from the young to the old generation are 
rather unusual. Figure 1 shows the total flow of financial and instrumental intergenerational 
support based on the Ageing Survey. Instrumental help includes assistance with housework, 
shopping or small repairs. The percentage numbers in figure 1 represent the share of each 
population group, giving support to another generation. 
Figure 1: Transfers and Help of the 40 to 54 years old and the 70 to 85 years old 
        Money and gifts                      Instrumental Help 
Base: Persons with parents (in law)) (n=1,393) resp. adult children 
 (n=659) outside the household 
children
n 
parents (in-law) 
40-54 years old 
11,6% 8,7% 
5,0% 27,1% 
2,2% 
35,9% 
10,2% 
10,1% 
     Money and gifts                       Instrumental help 
Base: Persons with parents (in law)  (n=1,393) resp. adult 
Children  (n=659) outside the household 
70-85 years old 
grandchildren
n 
24,2% 6,7% 
21,9
% 14,8%
 
7,1% 
2,9% 
0,2% 
0,5% 
children 
 
Source: Kohli et. al. (2000a), p. 193,194 
 
The left hand side of figure 1 refers to the middle generation of 40 to 54 year old persons. The 
transfer pattern is clear: financial support and gifts are given from the middle generation to 
their grown-up children outside the household while we observe only few transfers from the 
children to their parents. The transfers from the middle generation to their offspring are 
clearly higher than the middle generation receives from their parents. However, the direction 
of instrumental help is very different. While non-financial support is much more balanced 
                                                 
10 The Ageing Survey was conducted in 1996 by the sociological research group FALL. The survey includes rich 
information about the living conditions of persons aged 40 to 85. See Kohli et. al. (2000a) for a description of 
the data and results. 
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between the middle generation and their children, the 40 to 54 years old sample persons 
provide more support to their parents than they receive from them. 
The pattern that can be seen on the right hand side of figure 1 referring to the 70 to 85 years 
old respondents is very similar. Financial transfers mainly flow towards the younger 
generation. About one quarter of the sample persons aged between 70 and 85 give a financial 
transfer to at least one of their children and more than 20 percent to their grandchildren. The 
other way round, only 3 percent of the elderly receive financial aid from their children and 
hardly anything at all from their grandchildren. On the other side instrumental help goes from 
the younger to the older generation. While one fifth of the elderly receives such a support by 
their children, only 7 percent of the elderly are helping their children in such a way. The 
relation to the grandchildren is similarly unbalanced. Although the elderly have more time at 
hand because they are no longer employed, they rather give money to their children. The 
children have less time than their parents but support their parents nevertheless. This can be 
interpreted as a hint to the complex relationship between resources and needs as well as the 
underlying specific motivations of intergenerational aid (Kohli et. al. 2000a). 
3.2 The relationship between public and private transfers in 
Germany 
In the following section we add new empirical evidence to the discussion about crowding in 
and crowding out by investigating the relationship between public and private transfers from 
two perspectives: First we look at the influence of public transfers on the giving of private 
transfers of the elderly. A positive impact of public transfers on private transfer payments 
would be in line with the crowding- in argument and with the existence of a compensation 
process between the generations along Barro’s thoughts (see section 2.2.). In the second part 
we examine the receipt of financial private support by the elderly to test the crowding-out 
hypothesis. Ideally, one would need adequate longitudinal data for the analysis. As such data 
is currently not available we will exploit the variation of the composition of household 
income in Germany for our empirical analysis. This procedure supplements the evidence 
gained so far by international comparisons. The central variable to explain transfer behaviour 
in the subsequent analysis will be the fraction of public transfers in total household income. 
We test the crowding out hypothesis in a narrow sense, i.e. restricted to financial support, by 
estimating if those elderly who receive more public transfers receive less private financial 
help. Before we present the empirical findings we shortly describe the underlying data in the 
next section. 
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3.2.1 The data 
We base our analysis on the German Income and Expenditure Survey 1998 (EVS "Ein-
kommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben").11 The EVS has been collected by the Federal 
Statistical Office every five years since 1963. The main purpose of the EVS is to compre-
hensively examine the economic and social situation of private households in order to 
construct statistical measures for the government, such as various price indexes, poverty 
measures and measures of wealth accumulation (Euler 1992). Data on income, expenditures, 
home ownership, wealth and debt are collected. The EVS 1998 is provided to researchers as a 
“scientific use file” which contains nearly 80 percent of the original sample. In total the data 
from 49,720 households is included. The large sample size allows to analyse private transfers 
received by the elderly on a sound statistical basis. Most surveys suffer from the lack of 
variation because especially the share of elderly receiving private financial transfers is only 
small.12  
During the survey period each household keeps a detailed diary in which all income sources 
and expenditures for the most important areas are recorded for three months. This leads to a 
very good coverage of income and expenditures. Private transfers are covered as an income 
and an expenditure category “financial support to/from other private households”. While the 
EVS data is very rich with respect to sample size and detailed recording, the data shows some 
restrictions which have to be mentioned too. Firstly, the EVS data do not allow to distinguish 
between voluntary private transfers and alimonies which have to be paid by the transfer giver. 
Therefore we restrict the sample in the following analysis to households whose head is at least 
65 years old as legally enforced payments (due to divorce or illegitimate children for instance) 
do not occur very often in this age group. The restriction to this age-group still leaves a 
sample size of 8586 households. Secondly, we cannot distinguish intergenerational from other 
private transfers as one does not know from whom exactly the transfer comes or to whom it 
goes, e.g. from parents to children or to/or from a non-relative. But overall, the compre-
hensiveness of the EVS data with respect to income sources and expenditures, together with 
the large sample size is a solid basis to conduct the following new approach to investigate 
transfer behaviour. 
                                                 
11 See Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held und Schnabel (2001) for a comprehensive description of the EVS. 
12  See figure 1 or Croda (1999) for an analysis based on SOEP data. 
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3.2.2 Private transfer giving of the elderly and public transfers 
Due to the survey method - the households are obliged to keep household books - and the 
non-censoring of the transfer amounts which is common in most other surveys, private 
transfers are registered in the EVS data very comprehensively. In total, 62 percent of the 
households with a head aged 65 or older report a transfer to another private household in 
1998.13 On average 3157 DM have been paid in 1998 or 4960 DM per transfer giving 
household. While there is barely a difference in the percentage of households giving a transfer 
between the old and new German states14, transfer amounts are clearly higher in West-
Germany (5227 DM) than in East-Germany (3473 DM).15 The distribution of the transfer 
amounts differs significantly which is in line with the expectation. The median transfer 
amount is 1856 DM, ten percent of the transfers are smaller than 280 DM and the top decile 
of the transfer distribution starts at 9800 DM. Figure 2 shows the fraction of households who 
gave financial support to other private households in 1998 by income quartile. 
Figure 2: Transfer givers by income quartile 
Share of transfer givers by income quartile in %
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4
income quartile
%
West
East
 
Note: Only household head aged at least 65. Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1998. 
The higher the income, the more households are making private payments. The fraction of 
households transferring money to others is steadily increasing over the income quartiles. But 
even in the lowest quartile about half of the elderly households reported private transfers. 
                                                 
13 This is registered as an expenditure category in the household book: “Alimony and other financial transfers to 
persons outside the household (cash gifts). 
14 About 62% of West and 66% of East German households are private transfer givers. 
15 See Kohli, Künemund, Motel and Szydlik (2000) for a comparison between East and West Germany. 
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Unsurprisingly the same holds for the amount transferred while this pattern is more markedly 
in the old than the new federal states, see figure 3. 
Figure 3: Transfer amounts by income quartile 
Transfer amount given by income quartile in DM
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
1 2 3 4
income quartile
D
M West
East
 
Note: Only household head aged at least 65. Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1998. 
In order to address the direct link between public and private transfers we now look at how 
much public transfers contribute to the household income of the elderly. In this age group 
public transfers mainly consist of public pensions. Besides public pensions all other kinds of 
public financial support like social assistance or housing allowances are subsumed in this 
category, too. While the gross income on average amounts to 3437 DM (West) and 2694 DM 
(East) per month, the average household received public transfers of 2912 DM or 2744 DM 
per month in the Western or Eastern part of Germany respectively. On average public 
transfers make up for 82 percent of the household income in the old and 95 percent in the new 
states. With respect to transfer givers and non-givers a bivariate analysis shows no significant 
difference in the share of public transfers. 
In the following estimation we will test the impact of the share of public transfers on the 
willingness to give private transfers while controlling for household income, i.e. we ask if 
public transfers directly determine the payment of private transfers. Public transfers that are 
financed by the working age generation through social security contributions and taxes are 
expected to be given back to them via private channels. Therefore our hypothesis is that 
households with a higher share of public pensions in their income package show a higher 
propensity to give private financial support.  
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To test this hypothesis we firstly use a probit model to estimate the probability of giving a 
transfer. Because we need to control for the most important socio-economic characteristics we 
have to include characteristics like age, gender, family status and financial wealth of the 
household heads in the model. Based on former evidence we expect the demographic 
characteristics to be less important than the economic conditions (e.g. Reil-Held 2002, Attias-
Donfut and Wolff 2000).16  
As we have seen that the transfer behaviour as well as the importance of public transfers in 
the income package differs between the old and the new federal states, we run the regressions 
for East and West Germany separately. In the following we mainly concentrate on the old 
states and show the estimation results for the new states in the appendix. At first, we present 
the results of the probit estimation to explain the probability of making a private transfer in 
table 1. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if a private 
household paid private transfers and 0 otherwise. 
In the following investigation of the transfer amount one has to consider that only amounts 
greater than zero in the transfer case and zero otherwise can be observed.17 Therefore we use a 
Tobit estimation for the transfer amount which takes care of the left censoring of the 
independent variable at 0 DM.18 The results are displayed in table 2 and refer to the same 
independent variables as in the probit estimation.  
For both estimations, probit and tobit, three different specifications for public transfers have 
been used: (1) public transfers in DM, (2) share of public transfers in household income and 
(3) a Dummy-specification, representing firstly a public transfer share in income of 100 
percent and secondly a public transfer share which is lower than 75 percent of income. 
                                                 
16  Bivariate analysis show for instance that women are more reluctant to financially support others because they 
live more often alone and have a lower income (Motel and Sydlik, 1999) while in mu ltivariate analysis no 
gender differences can be found (Motel and Spieß, 1995; Motel and Szydlik, 1999). The results with respect to 
the family status are ambiguous. Single elderly effect transfers less often than couples (Motel und Szydlik, 
1999). Other studies found that especially elder men and couples give transfers to their offspring. The age-effect 
is ambiguous, too. While Motel und Szydlik (1999) could not find a significant impact, Jürges (1999) shows a 
probability of transfer giving which is decreasing by age. 
17 The size of the transfers cannot be estimated with a simple regression because the transfer giving itself depend 
already on several circumstances, for instance the existence of potential recipients. If we would consider in the 
estimation only transfer givers, the results would be distorted because of this sample selection. In such a case one 
usually uses the two-step Heckman-estimation (see e.g. Green 1997). At first it is necessary to build a separate 
model for the decision to give a transfer (selection equation), for which one needs to find appropriate instrument 
variables, that are related to the probability to give a transfer but not to its amount. Unfortunately, in the EVS 
data set no such variables (like the presence of adult children) are available. Therefore the Heckman-estimation 
did not lead to satisfactory results.  
18 In the following estimation a logarithmic specification for the amounts given respectively received was 
choosen because this leads to a much better fit of the regression. As the logarithm of 0 is not identified the non-
transfer payments have been set equal to one which is correspondingly used as the left-censoring point. 
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Table 1: Determinants of transfer giving (West)19 
 Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) 
Variable Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Age -0.1472 -2.06 -0.1465 -2.06 -0.1412 -1.99 
Age squared 0.0010 2.05 0.0010 -.06 0.0009 1.99 
Household size -0.2624 -4.63 -0.2677 -4.73 -0.2740 -4.84 
Female 0.1388 2.78 0.1309 2.62 0.1298 2.60 
Never married -0.4014 -4.60 -0.4104 -4.17 -0.4209 -4.84 
Widowed -0.0644 -0.85 -0.0719 -0.95 -0.0803 -1.06 
Married Reference - Reference  Reference  
Divorced -0.4110 -4.67 -0.4263 -4.86 -0.4456 -5.10 
Living 
Separately 
-0.2578 -1.85 -0.2978 -2.15 -0.3388 -2.46 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
0.3648 7.25 0.5503 14.55 0.5137 13.63 
Public transfers 
(log) 
0.1929 4.28 - - - - 
Public transfer 
income share  
  0.0030 3.57   
Share of public 
transfers =1 (D) 
- - - - -0.1043 -2.73 
1>Share of publ 
transf. <0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf.<0.75,D. 
- - - - -0.1194 -2.89 
Financial wealth -4.03e-08 -0.30 -5.57e-08 -0.42 -1.01e-07 -0.77 
Homeowner 0.1449 4.30 0.1473 4.38 0.1361 4.05 
Constant 2.8988 1.08 3.9620 1.49 4.1990 1.58 
       
Number of 
observations 
6788  6788  6788  
LF chi2(12) 379.99  377.53  377.15  
Pseudo R2 0.0422  0.0418  0.0417  
 
Note: Own calculations based on the EVS 1998. Sample includes households with a head aged 65 and older. 
Sample estimates are weighted to represent the German population. 
                                                 
19 See table 1a in the appendix for the estimation results based on the East sample. 
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Table 2: Determinants of transfer amounts given (West)20 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Variable Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Age -0.2728 -1.06 -0.2684 -1.05 -0.2517 -0.98 
Age squared 0.0020 1.16 0.0020 1.15 0.0019 1.09 
Household size -1.0062 -4.79 -1.020 -4.86 -1.0414 -4.96 
Female 0.4770 2.60 0.4498 2.46 0.4456 2.43 
Never married -1.4231 -4.39 -1.4431 -4.46 -1.4726 -4.55 
Widowed 0.0191 0.07 0.0080 0.03 -0.0202 -0.07 
Married Reference - Reference - Reference - 
Divorced -1.2647 -3.88 -1.2948 -3.98 -1.3534 -4.17 
Living 
Separately 
-0.0901 -0.18 -0.2078 -0.41 -0.3296 -0.65 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
1.5284 8.39 2.0611 15.29 1.9563 14.53 
Public 
transfers (log) 
0.5372 3.28 - - - - 
Public transfer 
income share  
- - 0.0091 3.02   
Share of public 
transfers =1,D. 
- - - - -0.2780 -1.99 
1>Share of publ 
transf. <0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf. <0.75,D 
- - - - -0.3450 -2.33 
Financial 
wealth 
-1.62e-07 -0.43 -1.81e-07 -0.38 -3.22e-07 -0.67 
Homeowner 0.5215 4.31 0.5309 4.39 0.5011 4.14 
Constant -6.7853 -0.7 -7.7305 -1.53 -6.3378 -0.66 
       
Number of 
observations 
6788  6788  6788  
LF chi2(12) 388.17  389.57  387.85  
Pseudo R2 0.0119  0.0119  0.0118  
Note: Own calculations based on EVS 1998. Sample estimates are weighted to represent the German population. 
Sample includes households with a head aged 65 and older. 
                                                 
20 See table 2a in the appendix for the estimation results based on the East sample. 
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The independent control variables mostly show the expected coefficients. Household heads 
who were never married or are divorced have a lower probability to give financial support to 
others than their married counterparts (reference category). The same holds for bigger house-
holds, while female household heads give more. Disposable household income proves to be 
the expected important determinant for giving transfers. The coefficient of the variable 
measuring financial wealth stays insignificant but homeownership is in the “old states” 
associated with a higher transfer probability.  
The results in table 2 which explain the amount transferred are very similar, but the overall fit 
of the estimation is worse. Again, larger households, never married and divorced heads give 
smaller amounts and homeowners pay more - holding everything else constant. Income is 
expectedly the important determinant, i.e. the higher the disposable household income, the 
more money is transferred. In the new federal states income has a positive coefficient too as 
well as the dummy representing female household heads. 
Here, the main purpose of these control variables is to isolate the impact of public transfers on 
the giving of private financial support. The estimation results in both tables show indeed a 
significant positive coefficient both for the amount of public transfers (probit 1) as well as for 
the share of public transfers in gross household income (probit 2)21. The motivation for the 
second model stems from social policy analysis about the income situation of the elderly 
where this measure is commonly used. But before interpreting this result we should first look 
at the third estimation variant (probit 3), which uses a dummy specification in order to 
improve our understanding of the importance of public transfers for private transfers. In this 
version the unequal distribution of the public transfer share is considered by creating dummy 
variables instead of assuming a linear relationship between the share of public transfers in 
retirement income and the probability of making a private transfer. For many elderly 
households public transfers are the only income source (transfer dummy 1 equals 1). If 
households totally depend on public payments we would expect them to show a lower 
probability for granting a transfer because their total dependence on a monthly annuity should 
restrict their financial scope. On the other hand we hypothesized a lower transfer propensity 
for households with a small share of public transfers in the income package, too. For these 
households public transfers make up for less than 75 percent of total household income. 
About a quarter of the households in the age group considered belong to this group. The 
reference category (transfer dummy 2) finally refers to households receiving public transfers 
                                                 
21 For the Eastern part of Germany this results hold for the probit but not the tobit estimation. 
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in an average range. For these households we expect a higher propensity to give private 
transfers. 
This specification yields the expected results in the probit as well as in the tobit model for the 
“old states”. Households who totally rely on public financial support are less likely to grant 
private transfers. The same holds true for households which have considerable other income 
sources than public transfers. On the other hand we see that households that give transfers are 
characterized by a substantial share of public transfers in household income.  
How can the positive influence of public transfers on the willingness to give private transfers 
be explained? In face of the high contribution rates that the working age generation has to pay 
to the pension system and the still generous general replacement rate it can be interpreted as a 
compensation device between the generations, like Barro postulated. From an economic 
perspective the backflow of resources from old to young is an inefficient detour system, 
mainly because high labour fringe costs impede economic growth. On the other hand 
sociologists argue that the impact of public on private transfers is a basis for crowding in: 
public transfers permit the elderly to award financial gifts to their adult children from which 
they can expect other support in return. Unfortunately, non-financial support cannot be 
observed in the EVS dataset that is evaluated in this paper, but this effect was shown in 
figure 1, based on data taken from the Ageing Survey. 
A second explanation could be that the elderly have been simply surprised by their high 
pension income and therefore give part of it to their children. Schnabel (2001) shows indeed 
that wage growth in the years of economic growth up to the 1970s was so large and 
unprecedented that the pensions for certain pensioner cohorts are even higher than their 
average labour income over the life-cycle. 
A third explanation is related to the problem of missing variables. From another viewpoint the 
results show that households with more private old age provision are more reluctant to pay 
private transfers.22 This might simply be because they have to rely on their funded claims and 
wealth instead of enjoying guaranteed life- long public pension annuities. Furthermore, the 
self-employed might not value family solidarity as high as the “employee household type”. 
 
                                                 
22 Unfortunately, the EVS data do not include the former occupational status for those already retired . 
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3.2.3 The receipt of private and public transfers by the elderly 
In this section we address the crowding out hypothesis by looking at financial transfers 
received by the elderly. Again, we start with some basic information about private transfer 
receipt that can be drawn from the EVS database. Like already seen in figure 1, the fraction of 
households that receive a private financial transfer with a head being at least 65 years old is 
much smaller than the share of households that grant a private transfer. Only 9.6 percent of 
households in the “Old States” in that age group reported the receipt of a private transfer in 
1998, compared with even fewer transfer recipients in the “New States” (5.0%).23 The 
average transfer to the elderly augments to 7012 DM24 which is more than the elderly give to 
other private households. One reason for this surprising result could be the receipt of 
bequests. The median transfer payment amounts to 3600 DM, which shows again the 
asymmetrical distribution that is shifted towards smaller transfers.25 The private payments are 
expectedly higher in the old than in the new German states (7636 DM resp. 5017 DM).  
Looking at age and income as two important determinants of transfer receipt, we find a stable 
fraction of elderly receiving private transfers in Germany for all age classes, ranging from 9 to 
11 percent. While the age pattern is similar in East and West Germany, the effect of the 
income is not. Figure 4 shows these differences for the old and new federal states very clearly.  
                                                 
23 Compare with “Five Nation Study”: help out with money (65+): often 9.0%, occasionally 14.8% 
24 The average over all households with a head aged 65 or more amount to 671 DM. 
25 The lower 10% of the distribution are smaller than 456 DM while the top 10% are more than 14972 DM. 
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Figure 4: Transfer receipt by income quartiles 
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Note: Only household head aged at least 65. Underlying income is income without private transfer. 
Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1998. 
The fraction of transfer receivers is the highest in the lowest income quartile in West 
Germany, but remains about constant among the remaining quartiles. We do not observe this 
pattern in the new federal states. 
Figure 5 shows the amount of private transfers received by the elderly. The average transfer is 
clearly increasing over the quartiles of the income distribution. The top quartile receives about 
four times more than the bottom one. Those who already have more income also receive more 
in case of private support. We already know this pattern from empirical analysis of inhe-
ritances (e.g. Szydlik 2004). 
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Figure 5: Transfer amounts received by income quartiles 
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Note: Only household head aged at least 65. Underlying income is income without private transfers. 
Source: Own calculations based on EVS 1998. 
We now test for the crowding-out hypothesis in the original sense that the provision of public 
financial support leads to a reduction of private financial help which would otherwise have 
been provided. Again, a probit and a tobit model are set up to estimate the probability of 
private transfer receipt respectively the amount received. We test the hypothesis that 
households who receive a larger fraction of public transfers are getting - ceteris paribus - less 
private transfers. Table 3 shows the results of the probit (probability of receiving a private 
transfer) and table 4 those of the tobit estimation (transfer amount). Detailed summary 
statistics of the variables are displayed in table A in the appendix.  
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Table 3: Determinants of transfer receiving (West) 26 
 Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) 
Variable Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Age 0.0098 0.10 0.0872 0.87 0.098 0.10 
Age squared -0.0004 -0.08 -0.0005 -0.79 0.0004 -0.08 
Household size 0.2943 4.23 0.2046 2.75 0.3326 4.85 
Female 0.2921 4.09 0.3343 4.42 0.3009 4.22 
Never married -0.2456 -2.04 -0.3747 -2.94 -0.1727 -1.45 
Widowed -0.1801 -1.74 -0.3301 -3.00 -0.1251 -1.22 
Married Reference - Reference  Reference  
Divorced 0.1293 1.13 -0.0847 -0.70 0.2343 2.09 
Living 
Separately 
0.5362 3.32 0.2755 1.55 0.6222 3.89 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
-0.1417 -2.22 -0.7737 -
15.41 
-0.7087 -
14.47 
Public transfers 
(log) 
-0.5374 -9.15 - - - - 
Public transfer 
income share  
- - 0.0244 -
22.69 
  
Share of public 
transfers =1 (D) 
- - - - -0.2961 -5.51 
Share of publ. 
transf. betw. 1 
and 0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf.<0.75, D. 
- - - - 0.2753 5.20 
Financial wealth 3.86e-07 2.21 -1.41e-07 -0.65 5.19e-07 3.13 
Homeowner -0.1333 -2.92 -0.2126 -4.37 -0.1358 -2.98 
Constant 4.7725 1.33 3.9620 1.49 5.0670 1.41 
       
Number of 
observations 
6788  6788  6788  
LF chi2(12) 369.80  846.32  386.77  
Pseudo R2 0.0800  0.1821  0.0832  
Note: Own calculations based on EVS 1998. Household income is pre-transfer income. Sample includes 
households with a head aged 65 and older. Sample estimates are weighted to represent the German population. 
                                                 
26 See table 3a in the appendix for the estimation results based on the East sample. 
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Table 4: Determinants of transfer amounts received (West) 27 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Variable Coefficient t-
value 
Coefficient t-
value 
Coefficient t-
value 
Age 3.7535 3.02 3.8473 3.42 3.2737 2.56 
Age squared -0.0238 -2.88 -0.0244 -3.25 -0.2049 -2.41 
Household size 4.7125 5.10 3.0271 3.63 5.7484 6.09 
Female 3.7457 3.99 3.5521 4.16 4.6897 4.81 
Never married 0.7110 0.46 -0.3518 -0.25 3.5599 2.24 
Widowed 2.4207 1.81 1.1381 0.95 4.4602 3.27 
Married Reference - Reference  Reference  
Divorced 4.6706 3.15 2.3473 1.74 8.9829 5.94 
Living 
Separately 
6.9517 3.37 1.8035 0.93 12.7473 6.19 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
-4.8934 -5.81 -11.2684 -
18.13 
-0.0003 -
15.56 
Public transfers 
(log) 
-8.5818 -
10.78 
- - - - 
Public transfer 
income share  
- - 0.2512 -
18.72 
  
Share of public 
transfers =1 (D) 
- - - - -2.4450 -3.47 
Share of publ. 
transf. betw. 1 
and 0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf.<0.75, D. 
- - - - 4.7707 6.66 
Financial wealth 2.82e-06 1.15 -2.93e-06 -1.20 6.08e-08 2.34 
Homeowner -2.8107 -4.68 -3.2677 -5.95 -2.4743 -4.03 
Constant -31.8820 -0.68 -31.4452 -0.75 -146.84 -3.06 
       
Number of 
observations 
6788  6788  6788  
LF chi2(12) 1051.66  1432.64  386.77  
Pseudo R2 0.1266  0.1714  0.0832  
Note: Own calculations based on EVS 1998. Household income is pre-transfer income. Sample includes 
households with a head aged 65 and older. Sample estimates are weighted to represent the German population. 
                                                 
27 See table 4a in the appendix for the estimation results based on the East sample. 
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The qualitative influence of the independent variables is about the same for the probability of 
receiving a transfer and for the size of the transfer. Larger households and women are more 
likely to receive a private transfer and to receive a larger amount. Divorced and heads of 
households living separated from their spouse have a higher propensity to get private financial 
support, which might be explained by the inclusion of alimonies. Income has the expected 
negative sign in both estimations, i.e. the lower the income the higher is the probability of 
receiving financial support and to get more. The estimations tend to show some positive 
impact for the variable measuring financial wealth, but it depends on the specification and 
thus is not very robust. Bequests to already wealthy households could be an explanation. 
Homeowners are clearly less likely to be supported and can expect only a smaller transfer 
amount than tenants.  
The coefficient of the amount (1) and the share of public transfers in gross income (2) is 
significantly negative. Accordingly, the analysis clearly shows that the elderly who receive 
more public transfers cannot expect to receive private financial help on top. Hence, the 
hypothesis about an underlying crowding out process cannot be rejected. The alternative 
specification which is displayed in the third colum (3) of tables 3 and 4 supports this inter-
pretation. The negative sign of the share of public transfers remains for the subgroup of 
households depending totally on public transfers. The public support they receive reduces the 
probability as well as the amount of private financial help. On the other hand we observe that 
households with a substantial share of own old-age provision receive bigger financial gifts 
from other private households.28  
However, some restrictions of the previous estimations have to be mentioned. Firstly, the 
estimations might suffer from the problem of left out variables. In the underlying EVS data 
we cannot match givers and recipients. That means we can neither observe the characteristics 
of the transfer recipients when investigating the transfer giving, nor those of the givers when 
analysing transfer reception. But the financial resources of givers and receivers have to be 
proved as important determinants in former empirical studies about transfer behaviour (e.g. 
Motel 1997, Attias-Donfut and Wolff 2000). Special events as a reason for awarding private 
transfers cannot be covered with the EVS data either.29 Moreover, the frequency of contact 
and the emotional tightness between parents and children has been proved to be relevant 
                                                 
28 One could argue that negative incentives of public programs impede relatives to help the elderly in need as 
they would loose their claim for public support due to private assistance. But, in Germany, social assistance 
works the other way round: the income of the children is already considered upon claiming. 
29 Jürges (1999) showed for instance that moving out of the parent’s household increases the probability to get 
financial help (Jürges 1999). Bhaumik (2001) examines the significance of demographic and other events for 
transfer behaviour. 
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(Motel und Szydlik, 1999). The same holds for liquidity constraints due to capital market 
imperfections which are eased by private transfers and are of concern for economists with 
respect to savings behaviour (Guiso and Jappelli 1991, Cox 1990). But, although these factors 
could not enter the analysis, the results are not expected to be distorted with respect to our 
central hypothesis because the left out variables are probably uncorrelated with the amount 
and fraction of public transfers in total income. However, the left out variables could be a 
reason for the overall unsatisfactory fit of the estimated model. 
Secondly, we only considered financial transfers. But Kohli (1993) for instance argues that 
the state provision of an adequate income for elderly people may result in shifts to other forms 
of private support. For example, if there is less need to support the elderly financially because 
they have enough income or wealth, private transfers from the adult children would be 
expected to decline, while at the same time the level of private services can be expected to 
increase. Figure 1 showed such an unbalanced relationship  between services and financial aid 
between parents and children. 
 
4. Conclusionss 
Starting from Barro’s thoughts about the relevance of private intergenerational relations for 
the public intergenerational allocation of resources, the relationship between private and 
public transfers was analysed in this paper. Indeed, the empirical analysis about the impact of 
public transfers on private transfers of the elderly in Germany showed a strong connection 
between the family and the state. From the observation that received public transfers 
positively influence private transfer giving two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, private 
payments act as a backflow of public intergenerational transfers and represent therefore an 
inefficient circular flow of resources. Secondly, reactions in private transfer behaviour to 
changes in pension policy can be expected. In light of the current pension reforms for instance 
aiming at a reduction of the public pension levels, a decrease of private financial support from 
the elderly to the young generation will be likely. 
On the other side, we asked if the receipt of public financial transfers by the elderly crowds 
out private financial support they would otherwise obtain. We actually found a significant 
negative influence of public transfers on the probability and the amount of receiving private 
financial help. This gives a clear hint to a crowding-out process which has to be considered 
when designing social security systems. The observation of an underlying crowding-out 
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process in German data is in line with the prevalence of an altruistic notion as a transfer 
motive. 
As the empirical analysis in this paper refers to financial transfers only, it does not necessarily 
contradict the sociological view of a “crowding in” process. Instead, the notion of Künemund 
and Rein (1999) that the relationship between public and private support might not be linear is 
supported. Therefore, crowding in and crowding out may occur at the same time. The results 
of this paper are in line with the argument that within an advanced welfare state like in 
Germany the wealthier receive non-financial support because they have something to return 
while the poorer elderly receive less private financial help when the state provides the income 
for their basic needs. 
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Appendix 
Table A:  Sample description: summary statistics of independent and  
explanatory variables 
 
Old federal states 
Variable Mean Standard 
 deviation 
Mini 
mum 
Maxi  
mum 
Age 73.8 5.53 65 85 
Household size 1.69 0.58 1 9 
Female 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Married 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Never married 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Widowed 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Divorced 0.98 0.30 0 1 
Living separately 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Disposable income 42,064 27,309 5,156 394,896 
Disposable income net of priv. transfers 41,239 26,822 2,000 394,896 
Share of public transfers 82.2 20.9 0 100 
Financial wealth 64,958 131,696 -208,121 3,363,594 
Homeowner 0.45 0.50 0 1 
New federal states 
Variable Mean Standard  
deviation 
Mini 
mum 
Maxi  
mum 
Age 73.1 5.21 65 85 
Household size 1.46 0.55 1 5 
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Married 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Never married 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Widowed 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Divorced 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Living separately 0.004 0.06 0 1 
Disposable income 32,580 14,489 9440 154,064 
Disposable income net of priv. transfers 32,327 14,283 9080 127,876 
Share of public transfers 95.3 9.9 0 100 
Financial wealth 26,215 34,330 -295,966 444,789 
Homeowner 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Note: Sample based on the Income Consumption Survey 1998 (EVS) includes households with a head aged at 
least 65. All numbers are weighted to represent the German population. 
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Table 1a: Determinants of transfer giving (East) 
 Probit (1)  Probit (2) Probit (3) 
Variable Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Age 0.3051 2.13 0.3292 2.32 0.3183 2.23 
Age squared - 0.0020 -2.10 -0.0022 -2.29 -0.0021 -2.19 
Household size 0.2182 -1.66 -0.2224 -1.64 -0.2275 -1.73 
Female 0.3361 3.20 0.3087 2.97 0.3263 3.10 
Never married -0.6345 -3.57 -0.6541 -3.68 -0.6587 -3.73 
Widowed -0.2028 -1.29 -0.2014 -1.28 -0.2215 -1.41 
Married Reference  Reference  Reference  
Divorced -0.39733 -2.27 0.4684 -2.71 -0.4345 -2.51 
Living 
Separately 
-0.9356 -1.94 -0.9278 -1.92 -0.9870 -2.06 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
0.0663 -0.26 0.0122 3.22 0.4279 3.39 
Public 
transfers (log) 
0.5262 1.99 - - - - 
Public transfer 
income share 
  0.0075 2.25   
Share of public 
transfers =1 
(D) 
- - - - 0.085 0.09 
Share of publ. 
transf. betw. 1 
and 0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf.  < 0.75 
(D) 
- - - - -0.1024 0.98 
Financial 
wealth 
-1.81e-06 1.67 1.82e-06 1.65 1.79e-06 1.65 
Homeowner 0.02988 0.34 0.0883 0.34 0.0216 0.25 
Constant -15.98 -2.91 -12.73 -2.41 -12.68 -2.39 
       
Number of 
observations 
1791  1791  1791  
LF chi2(12) 67.38  65.66  65.57  
Pseudo R2 0.0293  0.0286  0.0285  
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Table 2a: Determinants of transfer amounts given (East) 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Variable Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Age 1.1827 2.58 1.2825 2.80 1.2022 2.63 
Age squared -0.0076 -2.46 -0.0083 -2.70 -0.0077 -2.50 
Household size -0.4082 -0.98 -0.3425 -0.81 -0.4150 -0.99 
Female, D. 1.0847 3.25 0.9770 2.94 1.0735 3.20 
Never married, D -1.9267 -3.39 -2.0243 -3.56 -1.9742 -3.49 
Widowed, D. 0.1385 -0.28 -0.1159 -0.23 -0.1715 -0.35 
Married, D. Reference - Reference - Reference - 
Divorced, D. -1.0017 -1.78 -1.3045 -2.36 -1.0654 -1.92 
Living 
Separately, D. 
-2.4007 -1.46 -2.3809 -1.44 -2.4889 -1.52 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
0.5793 0.72 0.00004 3.42 1.6786 4.24 
Public transfers 
(log) 
1.1392 1.36 - - - - 
Public transfer 
income share  
- - 0.0183 1.62   
Share of public 
transfers =1, D. 
- - - - -0.0569 -0.20 
Share of publ. 
transf. betw. 1 
and 0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf.<0.75, D. 
- - - - -0.4024 -1.23 
Financial wealth 5.01e-06 1.61 5.40e-06 -0.38 -5.10e-06 1.63 
Homeowner, D. 0.1218 -0.44 -0.1257 -0.45 -0.1309 -0.48 
Constant -58.50 -3.41 -47.27 -2.78 -58.66 -3.41 
       
Number of 
observations 
1791  1791  1791  
LF chi2(12) 94.75  88.87  95.31  
Pseudo R2 0.0106  0.0100  0.0107  
Note: Own Calculations based on EVS 1998. Household income is pre-transfer income. Sample estimates are 
weighted to represent the German population. D. stands for “Dummy”. 
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Table 3a: Determinants of transfer receiving (East) 
 Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) 
Variable Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Coefficient z-
value 
Age 0.1181 0.49 0.2267 0.88 0.6835 0.28 
Age squared -0.0008 -0.49 -0.0014 -0.83 -0.0004 -0.28 
Household size 0.5016 2.79 0.4760 2.30 0.5355 2.96 
Female -0.1443 -0.77 -0.280 -1.38 -0.0798 -0.42 
Never married 0.5367 2.02 0.4516 1.60 0.5378 2.01 
Widowed 0.1498 0.62 0.0396 0.15 0.1692 0.70 
Married Reference - Reference  Reference  
Divorced 0.6450 2.42 0.4905 1.76 0.6671 2.52 
Living 
Separately 
1.9506 3.77 1.4496 2.35 1.9709 3.84 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
0.3453 0.82 -0.00003 -3.93 -0.4387 -2.16 
Public 
transfers (log) 
-0.7729 -1.77 - - - - 
Public transfer 
income share  
- - -0.4782 -
10.46 
  
Share of public 
transfers =1 
(D) 
- - - - -0.3996 -2.27 
Share of publ. 
transf. betw. 1 
and 0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf.  < 0.75 
(D) 
- - - - -0.1293 -0.79 
Financial 
wealth 
-2.10e-07 -0.12 -9.25e-07 -0.45 -3.02e-07 -0.16 
Homeowner -0.1755 -1.09 -0.2894 -1.64 -0.1396 -0.87 
Constant -2.5243 -0.28 -5.9962 -0.63 -0.4467 -0.05 
       
Number of 
observations 
1791  1791  1791  
LF chi2(12) 41.77  148.99  47.75  
Pseudo R2 0.0584  0.2082  0.0667  
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Table 4a: Determinants of transfer amounts received (East) 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Variable Coefficient t-
value 
Coefficient t-
value 
Coefficient t-
value 
Age 15.6268 3.82 11.5373 3.63 13.8501 3.43 
Age squared -0.1007 -3.69 -0.0727 -3.44 -0.0886 -3.29 
Household size 10.9690 3.94 8.4993 3.72 11.5397 4.11 
Female -3.3669 -1.19 -3.7132 -1.57 -2.4013 -0.84 
Never married 13.7445 3.34 9.2055 2.81 14.5221 3.47 
Widowed 9.0723 2.54 4.9723 1.78 10.0496 2.76 
Married Reference - Reference  Reference  
Divorced 11.3852 2.69 7.6609 2.35 13.1459 3.08 
Living 
Separately 
24.1893 3.21 8.9308 1.40 26.0602 3.46 
Disposable 
Income (log)  
5.8996 0.98 -0.0007 -6.71 -19.8346 -5.50 
Public transfers 
(log) 
-26.7802 -3.98 - - - - 
Public transfer 
income share  
- - -0.6240 --
8.96 
  
Share of public 
transfers =1 (D) 
- - - - -5.5540 -2.60 
Share of publ. 
transf. betw. 1 
and 0.75 
- - - - Reference - 
Share of public 
transf.<0.75, D. 
- - - - 1.4538 0.62 
Financial wealth -0.00002 -0.76 -8.37e-06 -0.37 -0.00003 -0.87 
Homeowner -2.4902 -1.01 -2.6515 -1.37 -1.6781 -0.69 
Constant -428.38 -2.94 -404.81 -3.44 -374.15 -2.56 
       
Number of 
observations 
1791  1791  1791  
LF chi2(12) 212.16  351.1  211.68  
Pseudo R2 0.1533  0.2537  0.1530  
Note: Own Calculations based on EVS 1998. Household income is pre-transfer income. Sample includes 
households with a head aged 65 and older.Sample estimates are weighted to represent the German population. 
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